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Abstract
Global demand for energy is rising around the world. Middle East is a major
supplier of oil and gas and remains an important region for any future oil and gas
developments. Meanwhile, managing oil and gas projects are becoming more challenging
and riskier than ever before. Therefore, risk analysis and development of strategies to
manage risk are crucial to the reduction of potential future delays and cost overruns in oil
and gas projects.
This thesis focuses on analysis and management of the technical and institutional
risks involved in oil and gas projects in the Middle East. In the first section, we describe
various types of risk and introduce a framework for risk management. We then conduct a
case study to highlight some of the most important risk factors involved in oil and gas
projects as well as recommendations to deal with such risks. The case is based on
publically available information and includes two distinct projects with similar geologies
under two separate legal regimes in Iran and Qatar.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Demand for energy is rising around the world. According to International Energy
Agency (IEA), global energy demand will grow at a rate of 1.6% until 2030. The main
driver behind this growth is increasing power generation and transportation needs. Global
demand for energy will be met by various types of energy as shown in Figure 1. In 2030,
fossil fuels will account for 80% of the energy mix, with oil and gas contributing close to
60%. 1
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Figure 1: World Energy Demand by Fuel, Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2008
Middle East, is a major supplier of oil and gas (Figures 2 and 3) and thus remains
an important region for any future oil and gas developments. Meanwhile, managing oil
and gas projects are becoming more challenging and riskier than ever before. Therefore,
risk analysis and development of strategies to cope with risks are crucial in order to
reduce potential future delays and cost overruns in oil and gas projects.
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In this thesis, we will conduct a case study of risk analysis for oil and gas
development in the Persian Gulf. The case is based on publically available information
and includes two distinct projects with similar geology under two separate legal regimes
in Iran and Qatar. Our qualitative discussion highlights some of the most important risk
factors involved in oil and gas projects as well as recommendations to deal with such
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risks. It is important to note that this study does not cover market related risks because
such research requires access to proprietary corporate information.
1.2 Background Information
Before we start the case discussion in chapter 2, we will provide background
information about risk analysis in this section. Our background section has three parts: In
the first part, we define risk. In the second part, we categorize various types of risk in
large engineering projects (LEPs). Finally in the third section, we introduce a risk
management framework and describe strategies to cope with risk.
Definition of Risk
According to Merriam-Webster, the word "Risk" is derived from the French word
"risque" and Italian word "risco" and its usage goes back to 17 h century. 2 There are
many definitions of risk that vary by specific domain and context. In the most general
terms, risk is described as situations or the resulting impact of events that unfold
negatively. However, in some domains such as financial engineering risk includes both
potential worse-than-expected as well as better-than-expected situations. In the case of
hazards or accidents, quantitatively, risk is defined by probability of an accident
multiplied by loss associated to that accident.
Some people also distinguish between uncertainty and risk. According to Douglas
Hubbard, uncertainty is the lack of complete certainty and characterizes situations in
which potential outcomes are not known. For example, in January 2009 the winner of
2010 FIFA World Cup is not known and the situation represents an uncertainty. On the
other hand, risk is an uncertainty that some of the possibilities involve a loss. For
example, there is a 30% chance that a proposed oil project in the Caspian Sea fails and
stakeholders incur a loss of $100 million. 3
Categories of Risk
LEPs such as development of oil and gas fields are risky and subject to cost
overruns and delays. We can bundle the risks faced by these projects into three broad
categories: Market related risks, Technical risks and Institutional risks. 4
Market Related Risks
Market Risks: Market risks are related to the ability to forecast the quantities and
prices of goods and services produced by LEPs. This risk varies with the type of the
projects. In the case of LEPs that produce specific localized services such as airports,
bridges, or high-speed rail lines, actual demand differs from initial assumptions and this
could put LEPs at risk to survive. In the case of oil and gas projects that produce
internationally traded products, particularly crude oil, they face the vagaries of
commodity markets with often intense price fluctuations. Some oil and gas projects face
both kinds of uncertainty, price uncertainty for traded outputs and demand uncertainty for
locally-bound products, such as gas that requires a dedicated transport network.
Supply Risks: Supply risks are related to uncertainties involved in price and
availability of necessary inputs to LEPs. For example, in oil and gas projects, dedicated
drilling rigs, heavy lift vessels as well as commodities such as cement, pipe and steel and
skilled labor are key to construction efforts.
Financial Risks: This refers to risks involved in attracting investors and moving
forward with a project, as well as changes in financial terms. An increase in credit
spreads, for example, could jeopardize a project located in a risky region. This type of
risk should not be confused with a scenario in which initial feasibility studies show no
prospect for future success. Financial risks also include inability to restructure financial
arrangements in the event of unexpected changes in the cash flows.
Technical Risks
Technological Risks: LEPs face a verity of technical risks reflecting their design
or the limitations of the underlying technologies.
Construction Risks: These are the challenges contractors and sub-contractors
face when building LEPs and the resulting uncertainties regarding cost (Capex) and
schedule. The sources of such risks could be different depend on the circumstances.
Sometimes, contractors bid aggressively underestimating the underlying geological
conditions or simply lack the experience to deliver the agreed upon obligations. Safety
issues can also become a major obstacle in fulfilling contract commitments.
Operational Risks: In some cases after the construction is finished, the
equipment does not work as it should. This may be due to lack of investment in quality
control systems from the beginning, especially in the case of projects involving new
technology and/or in new regions, or the lack of experience of operators.
Institutional Risks
Regulatory Risks: The property rights associated with each project are defined
by the legal regime in each country, but the specific terms are defined by contracts that
reside within these regions. Regulatory risks are mostly related to delays in obtaining
licenses and restrictions attached to such licenses by the regulatory body. These risks are
greater in underdeveloped countries in which institutions do not work within
constitutional frameworks as in developed nations.
Social-acceptability Risks: Sometimes sponsors face opposition from the public
for new projects. A good example is pressure from local community against building a
nuclear power plant due to concerns about treatment of nuclear wastes.
Sovereign Risks: This refers to cases where government abrogates or
renegotiates the terms of agreed contracts. Such scenarios usually happen because of
political shifts such as regime changes and economic changes. An example of contract
renegotiation took place during Iran's oil nationalization movement in the early 1950s
when government of Iran requested changes to the terms of agreement with Anglo-
Persian Company.
Dynamic Interactions ofRisks
LEPs face not only the risk categories mentioned in the previous section, but also
the compound risks resulted from dynamic interaction of individual risk categories. In
some cases, the compound risks can have huge impact on projects and make them
ungovernable. A delay in obtaining licensing (institutional risk) can postpone the
commissioning and start up phase of an LEP. This in turn, can potentially put the project
under financial risk as the projected revenue streams are further pushed out.
Risk Management
There is no doubt that stakes in LEPs are huge. Therefore, proper risk
management techniques are necessary to make LEPs successful. Figure 4 illustrates one
commonly used framework for managing risks in projects. 5
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Figure 4: Framework for Risk Management
The framework suggests identifying risksand analyzing them as early as possible
in the project life cycle. The process usually includes finding the sources of risks, the
severity of each risk and the dynamics between various sources of risks. Based on the
result of analysis, an action plan must be developed. The actions fall into four broad
categories which will be explained in the next section: Avoidance, Mitigation,
Transference and Embracing. Finally, project managers should incorporate a tracking
mechanism and correct any deviations from the set targets. The model also advocates an
effective communication mechanism among all the stakeholders during the entire project
period in order to successfully implement this framework.
Strategies to Cope with Risk
Once risks are identified and assessed, there are four major strategies to deal with
them. In subsequent sections we describe each of the strategies.
Avoidance:
In some cases, expected losses outweigh the potential benefits. In such scenarios
the most reasonable option is not to perform the risky activity.
Mitigation:
When risks are endogenous- that is specific to the project and controllable- the
best approach is to mitigate the risk by shaping the project. For example the parties
involved in the project can establish partnership with suppliers, develop flexible/ modular
technical solutions and change rules and regulations in order to shape the outcome of the
project and mitigate risks. Diversification can also be considered a special form of risk
mitigation in which the risk associated with one security is reduced by forming a
portfolio of securities.
Transference:
In some situations, risks are outside the control of one party but another party is
willing to take that risk for a premium. Insurance and hedging are prime examples of
transferring risks. For example people by hore insurance to protect their houses from
natural disasters.
Embracing:
Sometimes, the risk cannot be avoided, mitigated to stakeholder's advantage or
transferred to others. Seasoned managers know when to embrace the risk of ownership
and take advantage of the upside gain. Typically, comparative advantage of firms in
embracing the risk comes from their domain expertise and ability to control the
consequence of events or from their financial prowess (market capitalization, access to
capital market and financial diversification).
Figure 5 illustrates the relation of these strategies to two attributes of the risk. The x
axis shows the controllability degree of the risk and the y axis represents the scope of the
risk: Whether the risk is project specific or broad and impacts a large number of projects.
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Figure 5: Strategies to Cope with Risk 6
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Chapter 2 Case Study Analysis
In this chapter, we will do a case study in South Pars/ North Dome field which is
shared between Iran and Qatar. Our case involves a project conducted by Pars Oil and
Gas Company (POGC) in Iran and a project led by RasGas Company in Qatar. Our
objective is to demonstrate the analysis and management of technical and institutional
risks in real scenarios. We would also like to show the impact of the risk management
strategies on the project outcome. We picked two projects with similar geologies so that
when we compare and contrast the risks and associated risk management strategies, the
inherent geological characteristics do not become a factor. As a result, the primary
difference between the two has to do with technical concepts selection and execution,
institutional context and the resulting changes in governance, resulting risks and
management strategies.
Before we get into the details of each project, we begin the discussion by giving
an overview of the South Pars/ North Filed.
2.1 Overview of South Pars/ North Dome Field
The South Pars/North Dome field lies on the territorial border of Iran and Qatar in
the Persian Gulf. According to International Agency Organization, it is the largest gas
field of the world 1 with 40 to 50 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of reserves and some 50
billion barrels of condensate in place. 7 The gas filed contains significant amount of the
world's natural gas reserves considering that at the end of 2007 global proven reserves of
natural gas stood close to 180 tcm. I The area of the South Pars/North Dome is 9700
square kilometers of which 3700 square kilometers is in Iranian territory and the
remaining 6000 square kilometers rests in Qatari territory. Figure 6 illustrates the South
Pars/ North Dome in the Persian Gulf.
Figure 6: South Pars/ North Dome Gas Field in the Persian Gulf
2.2 North Dome Development Plan
The North Dome was discovered in 1971 and is estimated to contain 25.5 tcm of
natural gas reserves. In order to develop the North Dome, Qatar Petroleum Company
formed two joint ventures:
The first joint venture is Qatrgas which was established in 1984. The share
holders of this venture are Qatar Petroleum, ExxonMobil, Total, Mitsui, Marubeni,
ConocoPhillips and Shell. Qatargas has defined four projects with total of 7 LNG trains.
As of the end of 2008, project 1 which has three trains with total production of 10 million
tones per annum (mtpa) is finished. By the end of 2010, it is expected that three other
projects will be finished and total production of 7 trains reaches 42 mtpa. Qatargas also
has the Laffan Refinery Company Limited's plant currently under construction. The plant
is expected to start production in 2009, with a processing capacity of 146,000 barrels per
stream day (BPSD). 8
The second venture is RasGas which is established in 1998. The shareholders are
Qatar Petroleum (70%) and ExxonMobil (30%). As of the end of 2008, RasGas operates
5 LNG trains with 20.7 million mtpa of production capacity. It is expected that this
production will be in the region of 37 mtpa j' 2009 with the completion of another 2
trains. 9
Additionally, to support the exploration, storage and export of gas resources in the
North Dome field, government of Qatar established Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC) in
1996. The city covers an area of 106 square kilometers and is expected to expand to
nearly 250 square kilometers in the near future. 9
2.3 South Pars Development Plan
The South Pars field was discovered as an extension of Qatar's North Dome field
in 1990 by National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The field is estimated to contain some
14 tcm of gas reserves and some 18 billion barrels of gas condensates. In 1998,
government of Iran approved establishment of Pars Special Economic Energy Zone
(PSEEZ) to accommodate the South Pars related activities. PSEEZ covers an area of 100
square kilometers and has to two major sites: Site one is in Assaluyeh and Nakhl-e-Taghi
and the second site is in Tombak, some 60 kilometers west of Assaluyeh. 10
Furthermore, in 1998, the Pars Oil and Gas Company (POGC) was established by
NIOC to develop the South Pars filed. POGC has defined 24 phases in order to produce
820 million cubic meter of gas per day. The 24 phases include offshore facilities,
pipelines to transfer products from offshore facilities to onshore facilities, onshore
facilities, gas pipelines to transfer gas to national network and export facilities to export
gas condensates, LPG and sulfur. As of the end of 2008, 7 phases are in operation and the
rest of the phases are either under construction or study.
In the remainder of this chapter we will concentrate on two specific projects in the
South Pars/ North Dome field. The first project is phases 6, 7 and 8 in the South Pars and
the second one is the RGX in the North Dome. We gathered all the data for the two
projects from public information. However, in the case of phases 6, 7 and 8 project, we
resolved some of the ambiguities in the public information by interviewing two experts
who had exposure to South Pars projects.
Before we start our risk analysis discussion, we need to give an overview of each
of these projects.
2.4 Phases 6, 7 and 8 in South Pars
In July 2000, Pars Oil and Gas Company (POGC) awarded the contract for
developing phases 6, 7 and 8 to Petropars. Petropars which was founded in January 1998
is owned by Naftiran Intertrade Company, the financial arm of National Iranian Oil
Company.
POGC has set the following objectives for the phases 6, 7 and 8:10
* Daily production of 104 Mscm of sour and dry gas
* Daily production of 158,000 barrels of gas condensate per day
* Annual production of 1.6 million tons of liquid gas (propane and butane) "LPG" for
export.
In order to increase oil production in Aghajari oil field in Khuzestan province of
Iran, the sour gas produced in these phases is transferred via a 512 kilometer pipeline to
be injected into the oil wells. Later, however, decision was made to transfer some of this
gas to meet the domestic gas consumption and as a result a sweetening unit was
constructed next to phases 6, 7 and 8.
The project has onshore and offshore sections. The onshore section is located in
Assaluyeh in the Booshehr province and the offshore is 105 Km's in the sea of the
Persian Gulf. Figure 7 illustrates the onshore and offshore locations of phases 6, 7 and 8.
Figure 7: Phases 6, 7 and 8 in South Pars Gas Field, Source: Petropars Company
Phases 6, 7 and 8 Onshore Facilities
The onshore facilities consist of:
* Non-industrial buildings which include all administration, clinic, restaurants and
warehouse facilities needed for the operation of onshore refinery.
* A 160 MW gas turbo generator power plant for the onshore refinery
* 100 MVA power transmission line to supply the onshore refinery form a
petrochemical plant at the region
* An integrated fiber optic network for onshore and offshore communications of
phases 1 to 10
* Onshore sour gas refinery with the capacity of 110 million cubic meter of feed gas
including the following units:
o Reception Facilities
o High Pressure Separators
o Gas Dehydration
o NGL Extraction and Fractionation
o Export Gas Booster Compressor
o Condensate Stabilization
o MEG Recovery
o Sour Water Stripper
o LPG Treating Unit
o Condensate Storage
o LPG Storage
o Utilities
o Control System
Phases 6, 7 and 8 Offshore Facilities
The offshore facilities consist of:
* Three appraisal wells (one for each phase) and 27 development wells (nine for each
phase)
* Three production platforms. (Each platform consists of two main sections: Jacket and
Topside. Each Platform has 10 producer slots and 6 spare slots for future wells)
* Three 32" submarine pipelines for transferring gas to the onshore refinery, length of
each of which is about 105 km
* Three 4.5" pipeline for transferring glycol solution
* One single buoy mooring (SBM) terminal for exporting gas condensate
* A 5.4 kilometer 30" pipeline for transferring gas condensate to the SBM.
2.5 Phases 6, 7 and 8 Work Allocation to Contractors
One of the key objectives of POGC and Petropars is to develop domestic
technical and managerial expertise for executing complex oil and gas projects. Therefore,
it is the policy of both companies to allocate substantial share of designing, procurement,
fabrication, construction and installation of facilities (offshore and onshore) to domestic
companies. The second goal which is related to the previous goal is to accomplish
technology transfer through joint-venture agreements between local and foreign
companies.
Phases 6, 7 and 8 Onshore Task Breakdown "
The non-industrial buildings contract was awarded to Petropars on October 2004;
MANA was selected as the contractor for this project.
The power generation plant project for the refinery of phases 6, 7 and 8 was
awarded to Petropars on June 2005. Later the project was handed over to the joint venture
of Hirbodan and Hico FZE through an Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC)
contract. The duration of this project was scheduled to take about 20 months.
The integrated fiber optic network for phase 1 to 10 was also awarded to
Petropars in addition to the original service contract of phases 6, 7 and 8.
TIJD consortium which includes TOYO of Japan, IDRO of Iran, JGC of Japan
and Daelim of Korea was awarded the EPC contract for the refinery on May 2002. Site
preparation for the refinery was started on December 2001 and completed on December
2003 by Fater Kosaran Jonoob and Abad Rahan Pars. This project consisted of over 15
million square meters of soil work.
Overall, the entire Capex commitment at the time of contact for the onshore
section was $1.15 billion.
Phases 6, 7 and 8 Offshore Task Breakdown 11, 12
ISOICO an Iranian company was awarded EPC contract for the fabrication and
installation of jackets. ISOICO started its activities on July 2002 and completed its work
in January of 2004.
Sadra an Iranian company was awarded the EPC contact of topsides, flares,
intermediate-bridges, installation of 32" pipelines for a length of 105 Km, single point
mooring (SPM) and its connecting pipelines. These activities were performed on Sadra's
industrial island in Booshehr.
After Petropars established contracts with the main suppliers to the project
including Sadra, the company signed a buyback contract with Statoil, a Norwegian
company, in October 2002. Based on the contract, Statoil got 37% and Petropars got 63%
of the offshore section of phases 6, 7 and 8. The contract also gave the operatorship of the
offshore section to Statoil. The duration of the work expected to take four years. In
return, Statoil made a capital commitment of $300 million for the next four year period.
Statoil also became responsible for managing jacket, platform and topside fabrications,
sub sea piping, SPM and drilling of the development wells. According to the contract,
Statoil's capital commitment and return would be covered from sales revenues of
condensates and LPG over a four-year period from the start of production which was
planned late 2004. We defer the explanation of buyback contracts to the section we
discuss about institutional risks.
The total project management of phases 6, 7 and 8 remained the responsibility of
Petropars which also oversaw the management of Statoil, the offshore operator. The
NIOC would take over as production operator once the development was complete.
Overall, the entire Capex commitment at the time of contact for the offshore
section was $750 million.
2.6 Project Outcomes in Phases 6, 7 and 8
Phase 6, 7 and 8 has faced severe delays and cost overruns. In January 2006
Statoil announced $329 million ($237 million after tax) write down to the book value of
its shares in the offshore section of phases 6, 7 and 8. This is despite the fact that drilling
operations were finalized 40% faster than budget, saving 775 rig days. 13
Statoil blamed Sadra for not meeting its commitment for EPC contract of platform
topsides, plus the laying of the remaining one of three approximately 100-kilometer-long
pipelines from the field to shore. Statoil had to change the plans in order to meet delivery
obligations and considered strengthening of management resources and technical
expertise at Sadra as well as the possibility of transferring parts of the remaining work to
other contractors to complete the project. 13 Statoil became under further pressure when
the company faced bribery allegation related to phases 6, 7 and 8. In October 2006, the
company announced the settlement of the case by paying a $7.5 million fine. 14
In October 2008, phase 6 was officially inaugurated. For phase 7, construction
and installation was complete but pre-commissioning and commissioning works in
offshore topside were being done and for phase 8, at the time of inauguration there were
no topside and subsea pipeline installed. In th e other words, at the time of inauguration,
onshore refinery plant of all three phases was ready for operation but in the offshore
section only phase 6 was ready. By the end of 2008, offshore part of phase 7 was
completed and phase 7 was under operation as well as phase 6. For phase 8, as of January
2009, the topside is installed in the Persian Gulf and it's under pre-commissioning. Also
Solitaire (famous lay barge of Allseas Co.) is near to finish laying of pipeline of phase 8.
So it can be predicted that at most by the end of 2009, phase 8 would be operational.
According to Mr. Manouchehri, Managing Director of Petropars Company, each
phase of the project costs $1 billion and including the cost of power plant the total cost of
three phases would reach $3.3 billion. This means the project has faced about $800
million cost over run from the estimated $2.5 billion (Capex and Non-Capex) at time of
the contract.
2.7 RGX Project in North Dome 15
After successful launch of LNG trains 1 and 2 in 1999, RasGas embarked on an
expansion project also known as RGX. The odective of the projects was to produce 4.7
million ton per annum (Mtpa) of LNG from each of the three new LNG trains (Train 3,
Train 4 and Train 5).
The project was officially kicked off in year 2000, when RasGas awarded the
Front End Engineering and Design (FEED) contract. The project had onshore and
offshore sections. The onshore section is located in Ras Laffan Industrial City and the
offshore section is in the Persian Gulf.
RGX Onshore Facilities
The onshore facilities consist of:
* LNG Train 3 with production capacity of 4.7 mtpa based on APCI technology
Please note there was no LNG tank necessary for train 3 as the original three tanks
installed for LNG trains 1 and 2 was sufficient to handle additional production.
* LNG Train 4 with production capacity of 4.7 mtpa based on APCI technology
* LNG Tank 4 with the capacity of 140 cubic meters
* LNG Berth 3
* LNG Train 5 with production capacity of 4.7 mtpa based on APCI technology
* LNG Tank 5 with the capacity of 140 cubic meters
* NGL recovery from LNG train 4
* Al Khaleej Gas (AKG) project with the capacity to produce 750 million
standard cubic feet (Mscf) per day
* LNG Tank 6
RGX Offshore Facilities
The offshore facilities consist of:
* Four wellhead platforms
* Two 38" gas trunk lines
* Two 28" intrafield pipelines
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate RGX facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City.
Figure 8: RGX LNG Trains in Ras Laffan Industrial City 15
Figure 9: RGX Facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City 15
2.8 Work Allocation to Contractors
The strategy of RasGas was to award multiple projects simultaneously to single
set of contractors and replicate the design. The objective of maximization of work to
single contractor was to create execution synergies within the contactor's scope of work.
Replication was achieved at two distinct levels: design and execution.
At the design level, the following facilities had identical designs:
* LNG Trains 4 and 5
* LNG Tanks 4 and 5
* LPG Tanks and processing facilities within Al Khaleej Gas common LPG storage and
loading facility
At the execution level, EPC contactor was able to benefit from replication in the
following ways:
* A single project team was used for the entire 6 years of EPC work
* The key sub-contactors and vendors were maintained during the entire period
* Facilities to support construction was shared throughout the project
* Minimum rework for delivering same engineering work
* Optimal resource allocation from one facility to another by careful sequencing of
engineering and construction activities
* Uses of options during LNG train 3 purchase order for additional identical
equipments for future plants.
In 2001, RasGas awarded the EPC contact of the onshore section of RGX project
to a join venture of Chiyoda Corporation, Snamprogetti, Mitsui and Al Mana W.L.L
(CMS&A). The contract had a base scope and an option work. The base scope included
LNG train 3. The Option work included the rest of the items listed under the previous
Onshore Facilities section. Ultimately, the option work was also executed by CMS&A.
The EPC contact of the offshore section was given to J. Ray McDermott.
2.9 RGX Project Outcomes
Replication in design and execution and awarding the project to a single contractor
resulted in very positive outcomes for the project. Below, we summarize the results in
terms of reduction in cost and schedule as well as improvements in project safety and
quality.
* Cost Reduction: We do not have data for the dollar savings but we know that there
was 30% reduction in unit cost from train 3 to train 5. At least three sources
contributed to the cost savings: Replication of design reduced engineering man-hours
for LNG train 5 to 30% of engineering man-hours of LNG train 3. Additional
purchasing power was gained when initial commitment was made for resources and
equipment needed for train 3. Productivity increased by optimizing repetitive tasks.
* Schedule Reduction: Project duration defined from the time EPC awarded until
mechanical acceptance reduced from 36 months for train 1 and 2 to 33 months for
train 3 and 4 and 28 months for train 5. Design and execution plan replication
contributed to schedule reduction by reducing the critical path engineering activities,
minimizing changes and rework and retention of key subcontractors during the
project.
* More Effective Commissioning & Start-Up: Completion of similar projects within
a short period of time contributed to effective commissioning and start-up of projects.
Train 5 and Al Khaleej started 20 and 24 days after completion compared to 38 and
51 days for train 3 and train 4.
* Continuous Safety Improvement: RasGas had an excellent safety record on LNG
train 1 and 2 but RGX achieved even a better safety year after year. Using total
recordable injury rate (TRIR) as a measure, safety improved by 10% in 2004
compared to 2003. It reduced by one half in 2005 and by another one half in 2006.
The resulting TRIR was over 6 times lower than 5 year (2001-2005) industry average
for oil and gas producers in the Middle East.
* Continuous Quality Improvement: Similarities between train 3 and the subsequent
phases of RGX led to continuous quality improvement of the RGX. Figure 10
illustrates the quality improvement between train 3, train 4 and Al Khaleej Gas
projects by comparing warranty claims, lessons learned, technical queries and other
improvements.
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Figure 10: Comparison of Quality Improvement across Projects 15
2.10 Risk Analysis
In this section we will conduct a risk analysis discussion for phases 6, 7 and 8 in
the South Pars and RGX project in the North Dome. We follow the same risk
management framework we described in chapter 1 (Figure 4) for our analysis: First we
identity the sources of risks and analyze the significance of them in each project. Then we
evaluate the strategies adopted by stakeholders to cope with such risks. Throughout our
discussion, we will concentrate on two categories of risk: Technical and Institutional.
Technical Risk Analysis
As we recall from chapter 1, technical risks are divided into three sub-categories:
technological risks, construction risks and operational risks. In subsequent sections we
will compare and contrast the two projects with respect to each of these risks.
Technological Risks:
In phases 6, 7 and 8 the required technology for both offshore and onshore
facilities was very well known at the time of the project. Therefore, the technological risk
was very limited. In contrast, in the case of the RGX project, the design was based on a
very innovative solution and at the time was the world largest capacity LNG train in the
world. Based on the risk management strategies discussed in chapter 1 and illustrated in
Figure 5, we can say that the technological risk of RGX was specific to the project and
quite highly controllable. As a result, RasGas was able to mitigate the risk by shaping the
project. The shaping strategy adopted by RasGas in this instance was three fold:
replicating the design and execution, giving the project to a single contractor and creating
option in the contact. The replication of design and execution limited the scope of
technology uncertainty. In other words, the technical challenges and solutions to them
would be identical for all the trains. Awarding the contract to a single contactor
facilitated applying the technical lessons learned in the first LNG train to the future ones.
Furthermore, incorporating an option in the contract would prove the credibility of
underlying technology and the capacity/performance of the contractor before moving to
the next stage.
Construction Risks:
In phases 6, 7 and 8 Petropars was facing risk related to the construction of
onshore and offshore facilities. At the same time, the company had the mandate to
maximize domestic participation in the project. Local contractors had limited managerial
and technical capability for the execution of the project. Thus, construction risk would be
exacerbated by choosing the local contractors.
The strategy of Petropars to manage the construction risk was to shift the
indeterminate risks to firms specialized in such projects. Specifically, Petropars gave the
responsibility of executing the offshore project through a contract to Statoil while
keeping Sadra as the sub-contactor for the topsides and laying pipes. The same approach
was replicated for building the refinery in which the contact was awarded to a consortium
of TOYO of Japan, IDRO of Iran, JGC of Japan and Daelim of Korea. On the other hand,
from the perspective of Statoil, TOYO, JGC and Daelim with global operations the
construction risks in these projects were idiosyncratic and these companies could
minimize the risk by diversifying the portfolio of projects they were undertaking at that
point in time. Diversification is an effective strategy to minimize the overall risk at the
corporate level. But diversified companies still need to manage risk at the project level.
Statoil failed to achieve the principles of risk management framework which we
discussed in chapter 1 with respect to its share in the offshore section of phases 6, 7 and 8
in the South Pars. The company, should have identified, analyzed and planed for the
construction risks associated with Sadra's deliverables in the offshore section of the
project at the early stage of the project. One way to accomplish this goal was to launch a
FEED activity in order to develop a robust design similar to what RasGas did.
In the case of RGX, RasGas was free to use domestic or foreign contactors for the
project. But in order to reduce the construction risks; they awarded the onshore and
offshore sections to single contractors and created options in the contract. Awarding the
contract to a single contactor facilitated applying the execution lessons learned in the first
LNG train to the future ones and therefore reduced the construction risk. Furthermore,
incorporating option in the contract would give assurance to RasGas about execution
capability of the contactor before moving to the next phase of the project.
Operational Risks:
After commissioning and start up, NIOC and RasGas became the operator of
facilities in phases 6, 7 and 8 and RGX respectively. Both of these companies had
substantial managerial and technical expertise for operating onshore and offshore
facilities. Therefore, we believe operational risks involved in the two projects were
significantly mitigated.
Institutional Risks Analysis
According to the discussion in chapter 1, institutional risks are divided into three
sub-categories: regulatory risks, social acceptability risks and sovereign risks. In
subsequent sections we will compare and contrast the two projects with respect to each of
these risks.
Regulatory Risks:
The legal regime in each country defines the property rights and contracts
associated with each project. South Pars projects are awarded based on buyback
contracts, but North Dome is developed under production sharing contracts. Before we
discuss the risks associated with buyback and production sharing contracts, we need to
describe the main features of each contract.
Production Sharing Contracts: 16
Production sharing contracts have been adopted in various forms by different
countries. Thus, in the following discussion we will focus on the basic principles
underlying these agreements. In production sharing contracts the state draws on the
financial and technical skills of the IOC to develop the field. In these types of contracts,
the state holds the rights to the hydrocarbon reserves and the IOC works only as the
contractor. After the field is developed, the IOC has the right to recover its development
cost by appropriating a portion of the annual production known as cost oil. There is
usually a maximum limit on the cost oil known as cost stop. The cost stop varies
depending on the country and contract terms but is typically 30% to 60% of annual
production. In cases in which IOC remains the operator of the field, the recovery cost
also includes the ongoing operating costs as well. The proportion of the oil left after cost
oil is known as profit oil and split between the state and IOC according to a predefined
formula in a contract. The production sharing agreements also have provisions for
treatment of taxation which is beyond the scope of our study. Figure 11 illustrates a
simplified version of revenue breakdown in a product sharing contract based on 50 -50%
split between IOC and the state.
Revenue ($)
* IOC Profit Oil
" State Profit Oil
* Cost Oil (Capex)
O Cost Oil (Opex)
" Development Costs
* Exploration Costs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Years
Figure 11: Oil Revenue Breakdown under a Production Sharing Contract
Buyback Contracts: 17
Buyback contracts which were first introduced in Iran, aimed at securing the
state's sovereignty over its oil and gas resources. Under buyback agreements, an
International Oil Company (IOC) provides funding and develops the oil and gas fields on
behalf of and in the name of NIOC. In return, NIOC reimburses the IOC through direct
sales of resulting products or by payment of proceeds generated from selling the
products. According to buyback contracts, IOC work as the contractor for NIOC and not
as a partner. Once the project is developed, the operation is handed over to NIOC. In
some cases like the phases 6, 7 and 8 in South Pars the buyback contract is awarded to a
joint venture of IOC and a domestic company. In such scenarios each partner is jointly
and severally responsible to NIOC for financing and developing the project.
Before a buyback contract is awarded, a master development plan (MDP) is
generated based on exploratory activities. The MDP defines in details, the scope of work
needed for developing the field. According to the buyback contract, the IOC has the legal
obligation to implement the MDP and any deviation from MDP requires approval of the
NIOC. As a result, buyback contract requires IOC and NIOC to agree on the details of the
development at the time of contracting.
Fiscal Regime in Buyback:
As we explained in the previous section, IOC is responsible for funding the entire
project. Four categories of funding are conceived in a buyback contract:
* Capital costs (Capex)
* Non-capital costs (non-Capex)
* Operations Costs (Opex)
* Bank charges
Capex refer to all costs directly related to development plan specified in the contract.
Non-Capex refers to costs difficult to specify at the time of contract such as taxes, social
security and custom duties. Opex are costs incurred during commissioning and start up
before handing over the field completely to NIOC. Bank charges refer to financing cost
which is equal to London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus a defined percentage
(e.g. 0.75%). Once the objectives of the MDP have been met, these four categories of
costs are recovered. Capex is reimbursed up to the ceiling fixed in the contract. So any
cost overrun to implement the MDP shall be borne by IOC. There is no cap for non-
Capex, Opex and bank charges and they will be recoverable. In addition, a fixed amount
referred as remuneration fee will be agreed to be paid to IOC in return for its investment
and risks taken. Capex, non-Capex, bank charges and the remuneration fee will be
amortized in equal monthly payments over a certain number of cost recovery years as
specified in the contract (usually 3 to 5 years). Opex has priority over other costs and is
recovered in the quarter following that in which the cost was incurred. In buyback
contracts, the cost and remuneration fee are recovered by allocating a percentage of the
project output. This is usually 50% to 60% of total production. Figure 12 illustrates a
simplified oil revenue breakdown under a buyback contract similar to phases 6, 7 and 8 in
South Pars with four years of development period and four years of cost recovery period.
Revenue ($)
M NIOC Profit
* IOC Remuneration Fee
* IOC Bank Charges
O NIOC Opex
O IOC Opex
* IOC Non-Capex
* IOC Capex
Years- I 12345678
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 12: Oil Revenue Breakdown under a Buyback Contract
Comparison of IOC's Pay off in Production Sharing and Buyback Contracts
In this section we would like to highlight the differences between the IOC's pay
off for a given development project under buyback and production sharing contracts. We
try to explain the differences through a hypothetical project implemented based on
buyback and production sharing agreements similar to phases 6, 7 and 8 and RGX.
Suppose we have an LNG project for daily production of 50 Mscm or equivalent
of 1765 Mscf. We assume that project duration until first production (T Project), price of
LNG ( PLNG) and consequently annual revenue ( R LNG) have normal distributions :
Tproject - N (4 Years, 1 Year2)
PLNG -N ($4.67 /thousand scf, $24.17) > R LNG ($3 billion, $21.73)
We also make the assumption that the expected Capex (Cproject) for the project is $5
billion. It is estimated that the project needs additional $1 billion for non-Capex charges,
$200 million for bank and financing charges, $150 million during commissioning and
start up. This will bring estimated total cost (TCproject) of the project to $ 6.35 billion.
After the production starts, a $150 million is needed annually to run the facilities. If we
assume normal distribution for Cproject, TCProject will follow a normal distribution as well:
Cproject~ N ($5 billion, $2 1 billion) * TCproj ect- N ($6.35 billion, $2 1 billion)
Now, we consider a scenario that that IOC enters a buyback contract with a four
year recovery period, Capex ceiling of $ 5 billion and remuneration fee of $ 800 million.
The contract also limits the IOC cost recovery to 60% of the total production.
The annual Capex recoveries (ACR) for year 1 to 4 is approximately 50% of the
annual revenue (R LNG) less the non-Capex, bank charges, Opex and remuneration fee;
thus ACR follows a normal distribution:
ACR - N ($1.25 billion, $2 0.4325 billion)
The annual Capex recoveries from year 1 to 4 are independent from one another.
If we add the independent normal variables and apply the maximum $5 billion Capex
ceiling, the total four year IOC recovery (TCR) distribution will look like half of a bell
curve with mean of$ 5 billion and variance of $2 6.92 billion (Figure 13).
Figure 13: Total Capex recovery (TCP) Distribution from Year 1 to Year 4
Next, we consider a scenario that that IOC enters a production sharing contract
with 30%-70% split of revenue with the National Oil Company (NOC). The estimated
total cost is $ 6.35 billion. The contract limits the IOC cost recovery (cost oil) from 50%
to 60% of total production.
The annual cost oil (ACOR) recoveries for year 1 to 4 is approximately 50% of
the annual revenue (R LNG); thus ACOR follows a normal distribution:
ACOR - N ($1.587 billion, $2 0.4325 billion).
The annual cost oil recoveries from year 1 to 4 are independent from one another.
If we add the independent normal variables, the total four year cost oil recovery (TCOR)
distribution will follow a normal distribution as well (Figure 14):
Total Capex Recovery (TCP) Distribution
- Buyback Contract
2 3 4 5 6
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
$B
TCOR - N($ 6.35 billion, $2 0.692 billion)
Figure 14: Total Cost Oil Recovery (TCOR) Distribution from Year 1 to Year 4
In both buyback and production sharing cases, there is about 16% chance that the
project ends up having a Capex overrun of grater than $ 1 billion while still completing in
a four year period. Under the buyback contract, the maximum Capex that can be
recovered is only $5 billion with probability of 50% but production sharing contract has
no ceiling on Capex recovery and there is 12% chance that the entire cost be recovered
within four years. When there is residual Capex after year 4, it will be recovered in future
years.
There is also about 16% chance that the project ends up with a cost under-run of
greater than $1 billion while still completing in a four year period. Under the buyback
Total Cost Oil Recovery (TCOR) Distribution
I - Production Sahring I
11.35
-3.65 1.35 6.35
$B
contract, the probability that Capex recovery exceeds $4 billion is 84%. In product
sharing case the probability that Capex is fully recovered in four years is 88%.
In case of a delay, there is 16% chance that project takes more than five years but
finishes within budget.
In buyback case, the cost recovery period reduces to less than three years and the
chance to recover the entire Capex in three years is only 26% (Figure 15). Of course the
IOC misses the cash in flow associated to remuneration fee, bank charges and non-Capex
installments of the fourth year as well.
Cash Inflow Missed in Fourth Year: $500 million = 0.25 x ($ 1 billion non Capex+$ 800
million Remuneration + $ 200 million Bank charges)
Figure 15: Distribution of Capex Recovery in Three Years
Under the production sharing, there is 21% chance that the entire cost oil is
recovered in less than three years (Figure 16). But if the cost recovery requires more than
three years, there is no cap on the recovery period and the cost oil can be fully recovered.
The downside is that the original recovery period is shifted at least one year and the
initial projected revenue stream will be missed. For example if it takes four years to
recover the cost oil, the missed revenue in the fifth year would be $ 850 million.
Missed Revenue in Fifth Year: $ 855 million = 30% x ($ 3 billion Total Revenue- $150
million Opex)
Distribution of Capex Recovery in Three Years
0.26
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Figure 16: Distribution of Cost Oil Recovery in Three Years
Risks involved in Buyback Contracts
When an IOC company undertakes a buyback contract it faces several risks. First,
the IOC has to provide sufficient funding for the project. The Capex, non-Capex and
Opex may go beyond the estimated amounts at the time of contracting, but IOC is
responsible to fund the project. Second, Capex is only recoverable within the ceiling
agreed in the contract. Third, in the course of carrying out the project, more information
might become available about the field and MDP might need to be modified accordingly.
However, the IOC needs to get the approval of the NIOC for the proposed changes in
order to recover its costs. Forth, the recovery of cost and the remuneration fee is subject
to meeting MDP goals such as production level. Therefore, if IOC for any reason fails to
achieve these goals, the IOC will experience a big loss. Fifth, if the hydrocarbon prices
drop and remain low, the time to recover cost may surpass the cost recovery period
specified in the contract. Sixth, any delay not related to IOC will postpone the recovery
of cost and remuneration fee and the IOC may potentially experience a big loss. For
example local sub-contractors may not deliver their work on time or government
authorities might delay issuing required licenses.
IOCs can manage the risk related to buyback contracts at two levels. At the
project level, IOCs can follow a risk mitigation approach by project shaping. Building
robust engineering systems is one way to shape the outcome of projects. At the corporate
level, IOCs have to diversify their portfolio of projects in order to reduce the impact of
the risk associated with any specific project on their overall cash returns.
NIOC also takes risks by engaging in a buyback contracts. First, the IOC may
apply development techniques such as injecting water to the field too early which
compromises the long-term productivity of the hydrocarbon reservoir. The reason for
such actions is the fixed recovery cost and remuneration fee set at the time of contract
and IOC's incentive to finish the project under the predetermined costs. This is certainly
a clear example of moral hazards. Additionally, NIOC has stated technology transfer and
development of domestic work force as its high level objectives. The conditions in the
buyback contracts give no such incentives to the IOC to accommodate such goals. Third,
the predetermined scope of work laid out in MDP at the time of contract will force IOCs
to bid only for development of reservoirs with safe returns. These reservoirs are typically
large, have low development costs and do not need very advanced technology to develop.
From the perspective of NIOC, this exemplifies an adverse selection scenario in which
more sophisticated fields requiring more modern technologies are not selected by IOCs
for bidding. 18 Another factor that contributes to the adverse selection is the information
asymmetry that exists between NIOC and IOC. The information asymmetry is due to the
fact that MDP is developed by NIOC prior to awarding the contract.
NIOC's strategy to deal with risks associated with buyback contracts can be
different depending on the time horizon. In the short term, to the extent that NIOC can
create flexibility in buyback contracts, these contractual risks will be mitigated and NIOC
has to embrace the residual risks. In the long run, NIOC has to work with the parliament
of Iran and influence the petroleum law in order to overcome the contractual deficiencies
of buyback contracts.
Risks involved in Production Sharing Contracts
In production sharing contracts like buyback agreements, IOC has to provide
sufficient funding for the project. The development cost may go beyond the estimated
amounts at the time of contracting but IOC is responsible to fund the project. In case the
project fails, IOC bears the financial risk. According to our risk management framework,
the best way to mitigate such risk is by diversification of project portfolio at the corporate
level.
However unlike buyback contracts, IOC has the incentive to prolong the life of
the reservoirs and maximize the net present value of the project. This was certainly the
case in the RGX project where the most innovative LNG solution available at the time of
contracting was used. Also the incentive to develop domestic work force is higher
because IOC is engaged for a long period of time compared to buyback contracts. Finally,
there is less information asymmetry between the IOC and the national oil company with
respect to the reservoir. For example, in the case of RGX, RasGas the joint venture of
ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum launched FEED studies prior to the development
activity.
Other Regulatory Risks:
In addition to the legal regime, the organizational structure of the regulatory body
also poses risks to IOCs. In Iran, the hydrocarbon industry is highly fragmented. POGC is
responsible for the development of all phases in the South Pars field but National Iranian
Gas Export Company (NIGEC) is responsible for downstream and exporting the LNG.
For example, if Total wants to develop phase." 1 of the South Pars and export the LNG it
has to embrace the risk associated with the organizational structure and deal with two
different entities. On the other hand Qatar hydrocarbon industry is very monolithic and
Qatar Petroleum has been pushing forward with its ambitious LNG ventures in
association with the foreign partners. 19
Social Acceptability Risks:
In the past thirty years, Iran and Qatar have faced little or no pressure from the
public regarding the oil and gas projects. This is because these projects are built far from
the public eyes and they bring high revenues to the communities. Specifically, in the case
of Qatar there is no evidence of any public dissatisfaction with the North Dome projects.
In the case of Iran, there were some debates in the academic sector whether buyback
contracts awarded to foreign companies would comply with the national interest of Iran.
But none of these debates turned out as an obstacle for South Pars projects.
Sovereign Risks:
Middle East is one of the most volatile regions in the world. In the past thirty
years the region has experienced one major revolution in Iran, a war between Iran and
Iraq, and two wars between Iraq and US. The region has also been suffering from Arab-
Israeli conflicts for more than half a century. Nevertheless, the region remains very
important to the International Oil Companies (IOCs) because of its significant hydro
carbon reserves.
Regarding our particular case study in South Pars and North Dome, we believe
geopolitical risks associated with oil and gas projects in Iran are significantly higher than
the ones in Qatar. Both countries experience the systemic geopolitical risks facing the
region but in the case of Iran, the country has remained a major force against the western
policies in the region and therefore bears higher geopolitical risks.
Historically, the IOCs' approach toward managing sovereign risks has been to
influence and transform rules and regulations in these countries and to diversify their
project portfolio at the corporate level. Furthermore, at the project level, IOCs either
avoid bidding completely in the case of extreme geopolitical risks or demand higher risk
adjusted return when they bid for projects in countries with high geopolitical risks.
Dynamic Interactions of Technical and Institutional Risks
We mentioned in chapter 1 that the compound risks resulted from the dynamic
interaction of individual risk categories can have dramatic impact on project outcomes
and make LEPs potentially ungovernable. In this section, we would like to discuss the
dynamic interaction between technical and institutional risks involved in the phases 6, 7
and 8 and RGX.
In phases 6, 7 and 8, Petropars wanted to maximize the use of domestic work
force, despite lack of sufficient technical and managerial experience in local contractors.
Therefore, Petropars decided to shift some of the technical risks associated with
inexperienced local contractors to Statoil through a buyback contract. As we explained in
buyback contract section, such contracts carry significant institutional risks because of
their limited flexibility for any delays and cost overruns. Consequently, technical
challenges of the project combined with the institutional constraints of buyback contracts
made phases 6, 7 and 8 a complete disaster for Statoil. NIOC also suffered from the delay
in completion because it missed the projected revenues from the project.
On the other hand, RasGas was able to mitigate the technical risk by replicating
design and execution as well adopting a single contractor to accelerate the learning curve.
Institutional risks were also reduced through the production sharing nature of the join
venture. Therefore, we believe the RGX was less risky than phases 6, 7 and 8 from the
stand point of compound technical and institutional risks.
We can characterize the differences between dynamic interaction of risks
involved in RGX and phases 6, 7 and 8 with a simple simulation. For our simulation we
use the exact hypothetical example we previously introduced under Regulatory Risks
section.
First we assume the project is implemented under buyback contract and use
several local contractors. Suppose that due to technical complexity, the project faces a
one year delay with $300 million Capex overrun. According to the buyback contract, the
IOC can not recover any extra Capex and the recovery period reduces to three years.
Consequently, IOC will miss $300 million in Capex recovery. Additionally, the
probability that IOC recovers the agreed $5 billion Capex in three years is only 26% and
the potential loss due to missing of the projected revenue in the fourth year of initial
recovery schedule is $500 million. NIOC will also suffer from the delay in completion
because it misses the $ 1.1 billion projected revenue in the fourth year.
NIOC's Missed Revenue in the Fourth Year: $1.1 billion= $ 3billion Total revenue-$ 250
million IOC Non-Capex-$50 million Bank charges -$200 million Remuneration fee-
$150 million NIOC Opex -1.25 billion IOC Capex
Next we assume the project is developed under product sharing agreement. We
also replicate the design and execution and award the contract to a single contractor.
Suppose due to learning effect the project finishes one year ahead of schedule with $300
million cost under-run. In this case, both IOC and NOC benefit from the reduction in
project duration and cost. The extra year to recover the cost oil will increase the recovery
probability to 72% and any profit at the end of cost recovery is split 70%-30% between
NOC and IOC.
Profit of NOC after Cost Oil Recovery Period: $ 1.995 = 0.70 x ($3 billion Total revenue
-$ 150 million Opex)
Profit of NIOC after Cost Oil Recovery Period: $ 855 million = 30% x ($ 3 billion Total
Revenue- $150 million Opex)
This simulation shows how dynamic interaction of risks and the way compound
risks are handled can dramatically change the outcome of projects.
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Chapter 3 Summary and Conclusions
We started this work by underlining the significance of risk analysis and
management in oil and gas projects in the Middle East. We also introduced various types
of risk and a framework for risk management.
In chapter 2, we first gave an overview of North Dome/ South Pars gas field. We
selected two projects from the Iranian territory in South Pars and Qatari territory in North
Dome for our case study. The two projects had similar geologies but took place under
two different legal regimes. After, we explained the scope of work and the stakeholders
involved in each project, we conducted a qualitative risk analysis discussion. In our
analysis we compared and contrasted the risk factors and associated risk management
strategies between the two projects. We also saw how risks and the strategies to cope
with risks influence the outcome of the projects.
Both projects were facing considerable technical risks. In the Qatari scenario,
replication of design and execution and assigning EPC contract to a single contract turned
out to be a very effective risk management strategy. The project finished ahead of the
schedule and within budget. In contrary in case of the Iranian project, the technical risk
factors compounded by institutional risks in the absence of effective risk management led
to significant delays and cost overruns. We also explained what risk management
strategies could be adopted to change the outcome of the Iranian project.
For future, there are several aspects of oil and gas projects that can be
investigated. The relationship of risk and complexity deserves further research. Another
area that should be studied is the relationship of complexity and project performance.
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Abbreviations
EPC: Engineering, Procurement and Construction
FEED: Front-End Engineering Design
IEA: International Energy Agency
IOC: International Oil Company
LEP: Large Engineering Project
LIBOR: London Interbank Offered Rate
LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG: Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Mtoe: Million tones of oil equivalent
Mtpa: Million tones per annum
Mscf: Million standard cubic feet
Mscm: Million Standard Cubic Meters
MDP: master development plan
NIGEC: National Iranian Gas Export Company
NIOC: National Iranian Oil Company
NOC: National Oil Company
POGC: Pars Oil and Gas Company
SBM: Single Buoy Mooring
tcm: Trillion cubic meters
TRIR: Total Recordable Injury Rate
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